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a b s t r a c t
In the context of intuitionistic analysis, we consider the set F consisting of all continuous
functions φ from [0, 1] to R such that φ(0) = 0 and φ(1) = 1, and the set I0 consisting of
φ’s in F where there exists x ∈ [0, 1] such that φ(x) = 12 . It is well-known that there are
weak counterexamples to the intermediate value theorem, and with Brouwer’s continuity
principle we have I0 6= F . However, there exists no satisfying answer to I¬¬0 =? F .
We try to answer to this question by reducing it to a schema (which we call ED) about
intuitionistic decidability that asserts ‘‘there exists an intuitionistically enumerable set that
is not intuitionistically decidable’’. We also introduce the notion of strong Specker double
sequence, and prove that the existence of such a double sequence is equivalent to the
existence of a function φ ∈ Fmon where ¬∃x ∈ [0, 1](φ(x) = 12 ).
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Let F be the set of all continuous functions φ from [0, 1] to R such that φ(0) = 0 and φ(1) = 1. Let also I0 be the set
of φ’s in F such that for some x ∈ [0, 1], φ(x) = 12 . The intermediate value theorem states that F = I0. It is well-known
that there are Brouwerian weak counterexamples to the intermediate value theorem, and the theorem cannot be proved
constructively [2–4,8]. Although the intermediate value theorem is not constructively valid in the strong form, it can be
shown that
∀k∃x ∈ [0, 1]
(
|ψ(x)− 1
2
| < 2−k
)
,
for each ψ ∈ F (see [8]). If we strengthen the hypothesis of the intermediate value theorem, we can prove the theorem in
its strong form in the following sense (see [2]). For ϕ ∈ F , let A(ϕ) stand for
∀a, b ∈ [0, 1]
(
a < b→ ∃c ∈ [a, b]
(
ϕ(c)#
1
2
))
1.
Then for all ϕ ∈ F , if A(ϕ) holds then ∃xϕ(x) = 12 . In fact, the intermediate value theorem is equivalent to the non-
constructive principle LLPO, the lesser limited Principle of Omniscience, which asserts given a binary sequence 〈bn〉, containing
at most one 1, we have ([4], page 56):
either ∀n(b2n = 0) or ∀n(b2n+1 = 0).
We know that Brouwer’s continuity principle,WCN, which asserts
∀α∃nA(α, n)→ ∀α∃n∃m∀β(αm = βm→ A(β, n)),
and LLPO are inconsistent ([4], page 108). Furthermore, as a consequence ofWCN, one may derive F 6= I0. W. Veldman
derives more in [11]; he shows that WCN implies the existence of uncountably many subsets G of F with the property
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1 For real numbers r and s, r#s reads r is apart from s and is defined as (r < s) ∨ (r < s).
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I0 ⊆ G ⊂ I¬¬0 , where I¬¬0 is the complement of the complement of I0 in F . To do this, Veldman defines the notion of
‘perhaps’ as follows: for any function φ in F , φ perhaps assumes the value 12 if and only if there exists x in [0, 1] such that,
if φ(x)# 12 , then φ assumes the value
1
2 ; that is, as soon as one finds evidence that x positively fails to be a point where φ
assumes the value 12 , one will be able to calculate a number z in [0, 1]with the property φ(z) = 12 . Then for a subset G ⊆ F ,
the first perhapsive extension of G is defined to be the set of all φ ∈ F such that for some x ∈ [0, 1], if φ(x)# 12 , then φ belongs
to G. The nth perhapsive extension of G is the first perhapsive extension of the (n− 1)th perhapsive extension of G. Defining
In as the nth perhapsive extension of I0, it is proved that In ⊆ In+1 ⊂ I¬¬0 , and for each n, In+1 is not a subset of In. It is
also proved that I¬¬0 is perhapsive, i.e., its perhapsive extension coincides with itself [11].
However, there exists no satisfying answer to the question ‘‘does the set F coincide with the set I¬¬0 ?"; (see
section 6.3 in [11]). If one assumesMarkov’s principle,MP, in the form
∀x ∈ R(x 6= 0→ x#0),
one can answer the above question positively (see [11]).
Let Fmon be the class of all functions φ ∈ F satisfying the weak monotonicity condition:
∀x, y ∈ [0, 1](x ≤ y→ φ(x) ≤ φ(y)).
Let also (I0)mon be the class of all functions φ ∈ I0 satisfying the weak monotonicity condition. Veldman’s argument holds
for the weakly monotone functions as well (see section 6.1 in [11]), i.e.,WCN implies the existence of uncountably many
subsets G of Fmon with the property (I0)mon ⊆ G ⊂ (I0)¬¬mon.
We reduce Fmon 6= (I0)¬¬mon to a schema (which we call ED) about intuitionistic decidability which asserts ‘‘there exists
an intuitionistically enumerable set that is not intuitionistically decidable". We study the relation between (I0)¬¬mon $ Fmon,2
the existence of Specker sequences, and strong Specker Double sequences introduced in Section 4. It is shown that (I0)¬¬mon $
Fmon implies the existence of a Specker sequence, and the existence of a strong Specker double sequence is equivalent to
(I0)
¬¬
mon $ Fmon.
2. Intuitionistic decidability
In classical mathematics, a decidable subset of the set N of the natural numbers is defined as a recursive subset of N.
Intuitionistically, a subset A of N is called a decidable subset of N if one may decide, for each n, n ∈ A or not n ∈ A. The
sequence of decisions 0 ∈ A or 0 6∈ A, 1 ∈ A or 1 6∈ A, . . . , is not required to be given by an algorithm.
Let us call a subset A of N i-decidable (intuitionistically decidable) if and only if there exists α in NN such that ∀n(|α(n)−
n| ≤ 1), and for every n, n ∈ A if and only if α(n) = n, i.e.,
∃α[T(α) ∧ ∀n(n ∈ A↔ α(n) = n)],
where T(α) denotes∀n(|α(n)−n| ≤ 1). Note that, it is not required that the functionα be given by a finite algorithm; see [1].
Introducing an analog of recursively enumerable subsets of N, we define: a subset A of N is i-enumerable (intuitionistically
enumerable) if and only if there exists β in (N ∪ {⊥})N such that, for every n, n ∈ A⇔ ∃kβ(k) = n, i.e.,
∃β∀n(n ∈ A↔ ∃kβ(k) = n).
In constructive mathematics, ∃-PEM, the principle of limited omniscience, namely
∃-PEM ∀α(∃x(αx = 0) ∨ ¬∃x(αx = 0))
is refuted by both Church’s Thesis and the weak continuity principle (see [8], pages 194 and 209). In classical recursion
theory, there is a recursively enumerable set that is not recursive. The following theorem considers a similar case for
intuitionistic decidability.
Theorem 2.1 (¬∃-PEM). It is false that every i-enumerable set A ⊆ N is i-decidable.
Proof. See [1]. a
Corollary 2.2 (WCN). It is false that every i-enumerable set A ⊆ N is i-decidable.
Proof. WCN implies ¬∃-PEM. See [8] (page 209, proposition 6.4, and the last remark on page 194). a
The theorem above states
¬∀β∃α[T(α) ∧ ∀n(∃k(β(k) = n)↔ α(n) = n)],
which is not equivalent to
¬¬∃β¬∃α[T(α) ∧ ∀n(∃k(β(k) = n)↔ α(n) = n)].
2 A $ Bmeans A is a subset of B and there exists a ∈ B such that a 6∈ A.
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The latter statement asserts: the existence of a set that is i-enumerable but is not i-decidable is not false. Let us formulate
the sentence ‘‘there exists an i-enumerable subset of N that is not i-decidable" by
ED ∃β¬∃α[T(α) ∧ ∀n(∃k(β(k) = n)↔ α(n) = n)].
Accepting and using the principle of excluded middle, PEM, one may easily prove
∀β∃α[T(α) ∧ ∀n(∃k(β(k) = n)↔ α(n) = n)],
since ∀n(∃k(β(k) = n) ∨ ¬∃k(β(k) = n)), and so we may define
α(n) =
{
n if ∃kβ(k) = n,
n+ 1 if ¬∃kβ(k) = n.
The intuitionistic principle FAN ([8], page 217) states that for a given finitely branching spread T and a decidable property
A, if for each infinite branching α in T there is an initial segment αx satisfying the property A, then there is a uniform upper
bound to the x involved,
FAN [(∀n ∈ T )(An ∨ ¬An) ∧ (∀α ∈ T )∃xA(αx)] → ∃z(∀α ∈ T )(∃y ≤ z)A(αy).
The Kripke schema (see [8]) asserts
KS : for every formula A, ∃ξ(A↔ ∃x(ξ(x) 6= 0)).
Corollary 2.3. FAN+ KS+ AC-NN 0 ¬¬ED.
Proof. Note that the Fan principle (FAN), the axiom of choice (AC-NN) [8], and the Kripke schema (KS) are all classically
valid. a
In intuitionistic analysis,¬ED is a consequence of the principle of induction on monotone bars, BI1 andMP [7]. AsMP is
consistent with the intuitionistic theory FIM [6], it follows that¬¬ED is not provable in FIM.
3. The double negation of the intermediate value theorem
We investigate the question (I0)¬¬mon =? Fmon. We claim that (I0)¬¬mon $ Fmon implies the existence of a Specker sequence
and we then conclude Fmon 6= (I0)¬¬mon → ¬¬ED.3
A bounded monotone sequence 〈sn〉 of real numbers without a limit is called a Specker sequence. If a Specker sequence
exists then there exists an i-enumerable set which is not i-decidable, i.e., the existence of a Specker sequence implies
ED. Let 〈dn〉 be a fixed enumeration of Q, Ψ : N → N × N be a bijection, and Π0,Π1 : N × N → N be projections,
that is, Π0(m, n) = m and Π1(m, n) = n. If 〈rn〉 is a monotone increasing sequence of rationals in [0, 1] then the set
A = {q ∈ Q | ∃n(q ≤ rn)} is enumerated by
α(n) =
{
dΠ0Ψ (n) if dΠ0Ψ (n) ≤ rΠ1Ψ (n)
r1 otherwise,
and thus it is i-enumerable. Note that ifA is i-decidable then by an interval-halving argument, it is proved that 〈rn〉 converges.
Theorem 3.1. If (I0)¬¬mon $ Fmon, then there exists a Specker sequence.
Proof. Assume that (I0)¬¬mon $ Fmon. Then there exists φ ∈ Fmon such that φ 6∈ (I0)¬¬mon, i.e., φ ∈ (I0)¬¬¬mon , and thus
φ ∈ (I0)¬mon. Hence ¬∃x(φ(x) = 12 ). Let cn = 12 − 2−n−2. Then φ(0) < cn < φ(1), for all n ∈ N. By Theorem 6.1.4 in [8],
there exist xn ∈ [0, 1] such that
|φ(xn)− cn| < 2−n−11.
Since φ is continuous, for each n, we can find qn ∈ Q such that
|φ(qn)− φ(xn)| < 2−n−11,
and then |φ(qn)−cn| < 2−n−10. So φ(qn) < φ(qn+1), for each n ∈ N. Since φ is monotone, we have qn ≤ qn+1, n ∈ N, i.e., the
sequence 〈qn〉 is monotone increasing. This sequence is a Specker sequence and does not have a limit. Otherwise, suppose
that 〈qn〉 has a limit, and let lim〈qn〉 = x. From the continuity of φ, we have φ(x) = lim〈φ(qn)〉 = 12 . This is contradictory to
¬∃x(φ(x) = 12 ). a
Corollary 3.2. If (I0)¬¬mon $ Fmon, then ED.
Proof. This follows since the existence of a Specker sequence implies ED [1]. a
3 Note that A $ Bmeans A is a subset of B and there exists a ∈ B such that a 6∈ A. Also A 6= Bmeans ¬∀x(x ∈ A↔ x ∈ B).
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Theorem 3.3. If (I0)¬¬mon 6= Fmon then¬¬ED.
Proof. By the above corollary, we have
¬¬[(I0)¬¬mon $ Fmon] ⇒ ¬¬ED.
Let us have a closer look at the antecedent¬¬[(I0)¬¬mon $ Fmon]. The formula
¬¬[(I0)¬¬mon $ Fmon]
means ¬¬∃φ(φ ∈ Fmon ∧ φ 6∈ (I0)¬¬mon), which is equivalent to ¬∀φ¬(φ ∈ Fmon ∧ φ 6∈ (I0)¬¬mon), and
¬∀φ¬(φ ∈ Fmon ∧ φ 6∈ (I0)¬¬mon)≡ ¬∀φ(φ ∈ Fmon → ¬(φ 6∈ (I0)¬¬mon))≡ ¬∀φ(φ ∈ Fmon → ¬(φ ∈ (I0)¬¬¬mon )).
Finally, since for every subclass V of Fmon, V¬¬¬ coincide with V¬, we have ¬¬[(I0)¬¬mon $ Fmon] is equivalent to
¬∀φ(φ ∈ Fmon → ¬(φ ∈ (I0)¬mon)). Note that (I0)¬¬mon 6= Fmon means
¬∀φ(φ ∈ Fmon → φ ∈ (I0)¬¬mon).
So¬¬[(I0)¬¬mon $ Fmon] and (I0)¬¬mon 6= Fmon are equivalent. Thus (I0)¬¬mon 6= Fmon implies ¬¬ED. a
3.1. Perhaps convergence
W. Veldman defined the notion of perhapsity for the intermediate value theorem [11]. This notion also occurs in other
contexts such as perhapsive extension of subsets of Cantor space [10], perhaps-finite sets, and perhaps-rational numbers [11].
In this section, we define perhaps-convergence for bounded monotone increasing sequences of real numbers. For a bounded
monotone increasing sequence 〈sn〉 of real numbers, and a real numberM , we say the sequence 〈sn〉 is apart fromM if either
there exists N such thatM > N and N is an upper bound for 〈sn〉, or there exists n ∈ N such thatM < sn.
Definition 3.4. A bounded monotone increasing sequence 〈sn〉 is perhapsively convergent if and only if there exists a real
numberM such that if 〈sn〉 is apart fromM then 〈sn〉 has a limit.
LetB be the set of all monotone increasing sequences with lower bound 0 and upper bound 1, i.e.,
B = {〈sn〉 | ∀n(sn ∈ [0, 1] ∧ sn ≤ sn+1)}.
Let alsoL0 be the set of all sequences inB that converge, i.e.,
L0 = {〈sn〉 ∈ B | ∃s ∈ [0, 1](lim〈sn〉 = s)}.
For a subsetH ofB, the first perhapsive extension ofH is defined to be the set of all 〈sn〉 ∈ B such that, for someM ∈ [0, 1],
if 〈sn〉 is apart from M , then 〈sn〉 belongs to H . The nth perhapsive extension of H is the first perhapsive extension of the
(n− 1)th perhapsive extension ofH . For each n, the setLn denotes the nth perhapsive extension ofL0.
Example 3.5. For every α ∈ NN, we define the sequence 〈rαn 〉 by
rαn =
{ 1
4 − 2−n−5 if ¬∃k ≤ n(α(k) = 0),
3
4 − 2−n−5 if ∃k ≤ n(α(k) = 0).
Note that if 〈rαn 〉 is apart from 12 , then it converges. So for each α, 〈rαn 〉 ∈ L1. On the other hand, suppose that for every α,
〈rαn 〉 ∈ L0. That means for every α, we have lim〈rαn 〉 = rα , for some real number rα . Then, for every α, rα > 14 or rα < 34 .
Thus ∀α(∃k(α(k) = 0) ∨ ¬∃k(α(k) = 0)), i.e., ∃-PEM. So althoughL0 ⊆ L1, ¬∃-PEM implies ¬(L1 ⊆ L0).
Using these new notions, Theorem 3.1 asserts that if there exists a function φ ∈ (I0)¬mon, then there exists a sequence
〈sn〉 ∈ L¬0 . By the notation (In)mon, we refer to the class of all functionsφ ∈ In satisfying the condition ofweakmonotonicity.
Theorem 3.6. For every functionφ inFmon, there exists a sequence 〈qn〉 such that, for eachm, if 〈qn〉 belongs toLm thenφ belongs
to (Im)mon.
Proof. Let φ ∈ Fmon and let 〈qn〉 be the same monotone increasing sequence associated with φ, defined in the proof of
Theorem 3.1, in which |φ(qn)− cn| < 2−n−10, for cn = 12 − 2−n−2. Then
φ(qn) <
1
2
− 2−n−2 + 2−n−10 < 1
2
.
Next, we claim: For any y ∈ [0, 1], if φ(y)# 12 then 〈qn〉 is apart from y.
M. Ardeshir, R. Ramezanian / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 161 (2010) 737–744 741
To see this claim, first, note that if φ(y) > 12 , then by continuity of φ, there exists  > 0 such that φ(y − ) > 12 . By
monotonicity of φ,¬(y−  < qn), for all n ∈ N. Therefore qn ≤ y− 2 < y, for all n ∈ N. Second, if φ(y) < 12 , then again, by
continuity of φ, there exists  > 0 such that φ(y + ) < 12 . Hence there exists n ∈ N such that φ(y + ) < φ(qn) < 12 . By
monotonicity of φ, y+  ≤ qn, and thus y < qn, for some n ∈ N.
We show, by induction onm, that if 〈qn〉 ∈ Lm then φ ∈ (Im)mon, for allm ∈ N.
For m = 1, assume that 〈qn〉 ∈ L1. Hence there exists M ∈ [0, 1] such that if 〈qn〉 is apart from M , then 〈qn〉 ∈ L0. In
other words, there existsM ∈ [0, 1] such that if 〈qn〉 is apart fromM , then for some x, lim〈qn〉 = x, and then, because of the
continuity of φ,
φ(x) = lim〈φ(qn)〉 = 12
and so φ assumes the value 12 . On the other hand, if φ(M)#
1
2 then 〈qn〉 is apart from M , by the above claim. Hence, for this
M , if φ(M)# 12 then φ assumes the value
1
2 , and thus φ ∈ (I1)mon.
Now assume, for m = k, it is true that if 〈qn〉 ∈ Lm, then φ ∈ (Im)mon; we show the same is true for m = k + 1. Let
〈qn〉 ∈ Lk+1. Then there exists M ∈ [0, 1] such that if 〈qn〉 is apart from M , then 〈qn〉 ∈ Lk. So, by the above claim, there
exists M ∈ [0, 1] such that if φ(M)# 12 , then 〈qn〉 ∈ Lk. By the induction hypothesis, there exists M ∈ [0, 1] such that if
φ(M)# 12 , then φ ∈ (Ik)mon, which means φ ∈ (Ik+1)mon. a
4. Strong Specker double sequences
We introduce the notion of strong Specker double sequences, and examine their existence in intuitionistic analysis. We
show that the existence of such sequences is equivalent to (I0)¬¬mon $ Fmon.
Definition 4.1. Suppose that 〈xn〉 is a sequence in R and x ∈ R. We say x is a weak limit of 〈xn〉, denoted by limw〈xn〉 = x, if
∀k¬¬∃n∀m(m > n→ |x− xm| < 2−k).
Definition 4.2. Let 〈rn〉 and 〈sn〉 be two sequences of real numbers,
a. The pair 〈rn, sn〉 is a double sequence if
(1) rn ≤ rn+1 ≤ sn+1 ≤ sn, and
(2) for any q ∈ Q, ¬∃n (q < rn)→ ¬¬∃m (q ≥ sm).
b. The weak limit of a double sequence 〈rn, sn〉 is the weak limit of 〈rn〉.
Definition 4.3. A strong Specker double sequence is a double sequence 〈rn, sn〉without a weak limit.
In the two following theorems, we study the relation of the existence of strong Specker double sequence to the double
negation of the intermediate value theorem.
Theorem 4.4. If a strong Specker double sequence exists, then there exists φ ∈ F such that ¬∃x(φ(x) = 12 ), in other words
I¬¬0 $ F .
Proof. Assume that 〈rn, sn〉 is a strong Specker double sequence in [ 18 , 78 ]. We define
ψn(x) = min
(
1
2rn
x− 1
2
, 0
)
+max
(
0,
1
2− 2sn (x− sn)
)
,
over [0, 1]. So ψn(0) = − 12 , ψn(1) = 12 , for each n. Let φ =
∑∞
n=1 2−nψn + 12 . Hence clearly φ ∈ F , and φ is continuous
since ψns are continuous. Moreover
φ(0) =
∞∑
n=1
2−nψn(0)+ 12 =
∞∑
n=1
2−n
(
−1
2
)
+ 1
2
= 0, and
φ(1) =
∞∑
n=1
2−nψn(1)+ 12 =
∞∑
n=1
2−n
(
1
2
)
+ 1
2
= 1.
We claim that¬∃x(φ(x) = 12 ). Suppose such an x exists, i.e., φ(x) = 12 . Then
∀n(rn ≤ x ≤ sn).
If x < rn for some n ∈ N, then for allm ≥ n, x < rm, which implies
∀m ≥ n(ψm(x) < 0).
Also for each t < n, we have x < rn < st , due to the definition of double sequence, and therefore ψt(x) ≤ 0. So
∞∑
n=1
2−nψn(0) < 0,
and it follows that φ(x) < 12 , a contradiction. In the same way, one can prove x ≤ sn, for each n ∈ N. Next we show that x
is the weak limit of 〈rn〉. For any q ∈ Q, if q < x, then ¬¬∃n(q < rn), since, by the second property of double sequences in
Definition 4.2, if ¬∃n(q < rn) then ¬¬∃m(q ≥ sm), and the latter statement contradicts with ∀m(x ≤ sm). For an arbitrary
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k ∈ N, choose q ∈ Q such that x− 2−k < q < x. Then ∀m(q < rm → |x− rm| < 2−k). On the other hand, by monotonicity
of 〈rn〉,
∃n(q < rn)→ ∃n∀m(m > n→ q < rm),
so
∃n(q < rn)→ ∃n∀m(m > n→ |x− rm| < 2−k).
Since we have¬¬∃n(q < rn), we derive ¬¬∃n∀m(m > n→ |x− rm| < 2−k).
Therefore
∀k¬¬∃n∀m(m > n→ |x− rm| < 2−k),
i.e., limw〈rn〉 = x. This is contradictory to the assumption that 〈rn, sn〉 is a strong Specker double sequence. So¬∃x(φ(x) =
1
2 ). a
Theorem 4.5. If (I0)¬¬mon $ Fmon, then a strong Specker double sequence exists.
Proof. Assume φ ∈ Fmon such that φ 6∈ (I0)¬¬mon, and thus ¬∃x(φ(x) = 12 ). We define a strong Specker double sequence〈rn, sn〉 as follows. Let 〈rn〉 be the same increasing sequence 〈qn〉 associated with φ, defined in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
For 〈sn〉, let dn = 12 + 2−n−2. Then φ(0) < dn < φ(1), for all n ∈ N. By Theorem 6.1.4 in [8], there exist xn ∈ [0, 1] such
that
|φ(xn)− dn| < 2−n−11.
Since φ is continuous, for each n, we can find sn ∈ Q such that
|φ(sn)− φ(xn)| < 2−n−11,
and then |φ(sn)−dn| < 2−n−10. So φ(sn) > φ(sn+1), for each n ∈ N. Since φ is monotone, we have sn ≥ sn+1, for each n ∈ N,
i.e., the sequence 〈sn〉 is monotone decreasing. As for each n,m, φ(rn) < 12 < φ(sm) and φ is monotone, we have for all n,m,
rn ≤ sm. Therefore, for all n,
rn ≤ rn+1 ≤ sn+1 ≤ sn.
Assume that q ∈ Q, ¬∃n(q < rn), and ¬∃(q ≥ sm). Then, for each n, we have q ≥ rn and q < sn (note that for each n,
both rn and sn are rationals). Since φ is monotone,
1
2
− 2−n−2 − 2−n−10 < φ(rn) ≤ φ(q) ≤ φ(sn) < 12 + 2
−n−2 + 2−n−10
for all n. So,
lim
(
1
2
− 2−n−2 − 2−n−10
)
≤ φ(q) ≤ lim
(
1
2
+ 2−n−2 + 2−n−10
)
,
that is, 12 ≤ φ(q) ≤ 12 , and ¬(φ(q)# 12 ). Then φ(q) = 12 . That contradicts the assumption that ¬∃x(φ(x) = 12 ). So,
for any q ∈ Q, ¬∃n (q < rn)→ ¬¬∃m (q ≥ sm),
and 〈rn, sn〉 is a double sequence.
We show that the sequence 〈rn〉 has no weak limit. Assume that limw〈rn〉 = r ∈ R. It is easy to observe that
for each n, rn ≤ r (∗).
Let t ∈ N be arbitrary and rt > r . Then for some k1, 2−k1 < rt − r . Since the sequence 〈rt〉 is monotone increasing, we have,
for allm > t ,
rm − r > 2−k1 .
But that contradicts limw〈rn〉 = r , which implies
¬¬∃n∀m(m > n→ |r − rm| < 2−k1).
Also, we have
for each n, sn ≥ r (∗∗).
Let t ∈ N be arbitrary and assume r > st , then for some k2, 2−k2 < r − st < r − rn, for all n. That contradicts limw〈rn〉 = r .
By (∗) and (∗∗), we have rn ≤ r ≤ sn, for all n. By monotonicity of φ,
1
2
− 2−n−2 − 2−n−10 < φ(rn) ≤ φ(r) ≤ φ(sn) < 12 + 2
−n−2 + 2−n−10
for all n. Then φ(r) = 12 , which in turn contradicts ¬∃x(φ(x) = 12 ). Therefore 〈rn, sn〉 is a strong Specker double
sequence. a
Corollary 4.6. (I0)¬¬mon $ Fmon if and only if a strong Specker double sequence exists.
Proof. See Theorems 4.4 and 4.5. Note that the function φ introduced in Theorem 4.4 is monotone increasing. a
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Corollary 4.7. The existence of a strong Specker double sequence implies ED.
Proof. Combine the Corollaries 3.2 and 4.6. a
As is seen in the proof of Theorem 4.5, for a pair of sequences 〈rn, sn〉 with the property that for each n, rn ≤ rn+1 ≤
sn+1 ≤ sn, if limw〈rn〉 = r then ∀n(rn ≤ r ≤ sn). So, one may verify that 〈rn, sn〉 is a strong Specker double sequence if and
only if
(i) for each n,
rn ≤ rn+1 ≤ sn+1 ≤ sn, and
(ii) there exists no real number x such that
∀n(rn ≤ x ≤ sn).
Suppose that a pair of sequences 〈rn, sn〉 satisfies (i) and (ii). Note that, for each q ∈ Q, if ¬∃n(q < rn) and ¬∃m(q ≥ sm)
then for all n, rn ≤ q < sn. It follows from (ii) that, for each q ∈ Q, if ¬∃n(q < rn) then ¬¬∃m(q ≥ sm), that is, the
condition a.2 in Definition 4.2 is satisfied. Also, if a pair of sequences 〈rn, sn〉 satisfies (i) and (ii) then the sequence 〈rn〉 has
no weak limit, due to the fact that if limw〈rn〉 exists then ∀n(rn ≤ limw〈rn〉 ≤ sn). So the pair 〈rn, sn〉 is a strong Specker
double sequence. For the converse, assume that 〈rn, sn〉 is a strong Specker double sequence. One may observe that for any
real number x, if ∀n(rn ≤ x ≤ sn) then limw〈rn〉 = x. Assume ∀n(rn ≤ x ≤ sn). Let k ∈ N be arbitrary and choose p ∈ Q such
that x− 2−k < p < x. We have p < sn for all n, and using the property
(∀q ∈ Q)(¬∃n (q < rn)→ ¬¬∃m (q ≥ sm)),
we obtain¬¬∃n (p < rn). That implies
¬¬∃n∀m(m > n→ |x− rm| < 2−k).
By the above argument, the notion of strong Specker double sequences seems very similar to the notion of ‘‘hohle
Intervallschachtelung" considered by Brouwer [5]. A ‘‘hohle Intervallschachtelung", a positively hollow sequence of intervals,
is an infinite sequence of nested intervals (an, bn) (with an < an+1 < bn+1 < bn), in the way that for each x ∈ R, there
exists n such that x positively fails to belong to (an, bn), that is, either x < an or bn < x. Brouwer, using a simple bisection
argument, showed that the assumption of the existence of positively hollow sequence of intervals leads to a contradiction.
Suppose (an, bn) is a positively hollow sequence of intervals. Take c = 12 (a0 + b0), and find n0 such that c positively fails to
be in (an0 , bn0). Again take c = 12 (an0 + bn0), and find n1 such that c positively fails to be in (an1 , bn1). Repeat the process
and generate the sequence
(an0 , bn0), (an1 , bn1), (an2 , bn2), ... ,
which is a real number x.We have, for each i, (bni+1−ani+1) < 12 (bni−ani). Since for all n, an < x < bn, we get a contradiction.
D. van Dantzig [9] questioned the existence of an infinite sequence of nested intervals [an, bn] (with an ≤ an+1 ≤ bn+1 ≤
bn), in the way that, there exists no real number x such that ∀n(an ≤ x ≤ bn). He left the answer to the existence of such
sequences open. Actually, he attempted (but did not succeed) to constructively prove
¬∀x ∈ R¬∀n ∈ N(x ∈ [an, bn])
as a weak interpretation of the Cantor’s theorem, which states that the intersection of a decreasing sequence of compact
inhabited subsets of real numbers is inhabited [9], i.e.,
∃x ∈ R∀n ∈ N(x ∈ [an, bn]).
We observe that the sequences of intervals regarded by van Dantzig and our strong Specker double sequences are the
same. In a sequel to this paper, we intend to examine the existence of the strong Specker double sequences.
Definition 4.8. Let T 1−0 be the spread of all binary sequences containing at most one 1, i.e.,
∀n(α(n) = 1 ∨ α(n) = 0) and ∀n(α(n) = 1→ (∀k < n)(α(k) = 0)).
The Lesser Limited Principle of Omniscience is the following schema:
LLPO (∀α ∈ T 1−0)[∀n(α(2n) = 0)) ∨ ∀n(α(2n+ 1) = 0))].
We introduce another schema as follows:
LP (∀α ∈ T 1−0)[¬¬∃n(α(n) = 1)→ (∀n(α(2n) = 0)) ∨ (∀n(α(2n+ 1) = 0))].
Proposition 4.9.
1. LLPO implies LP.
2. WCN+ LP impliesMP.
3. WCN refutes LLPO.
4. WCN+ KS implies ¬LP.
5. MP implies LP.
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Proof. See section 4 in [1]. a
Proposition 4.10 (¬LP). It is false that every double sequence 〈rn, sn〉 has a weak limit in R.
Proof. See section 4 in [1]. a
The following theorem examines the existence of strong Specker double sequences in intuitionistic analysis.
Theorem 4.11 (WCN+ KS). It is false that every double sequence 〈rn, sn〉 has a weak limit in R.
Proof. Easily implied by Propositions 4.9 and 4.10. a
5. Concluding remarks
5.1. F =? I¬¬0
We did not provide an answer to the question F =? I¬¬0 . What we have shown is that the existence of a strong Specker
double sequence implies I¬¬0 $ F . If one can show that the existence of a function φ ∈ F with the property¬∃xφ(x) = 12
implies the existence of a monotone function ψ ∈ Fmon with the same property ¬∃x(ψ(x) = 12 ), then one can reduce the
question F =? (I0)¬¬ to Fmon =? (I0)¬¬mon.
5.2. L¬¬m =? B
There are many interesting questions related to the one in the above title. For example, is there any relation between the
hierarchyLn of increasing bounded sequences inB, and the hierarchyIn. Moreover, is there any relation betweenL¬¬m = B
and the well-known intuitionistic axioms, likeWCN, FAN, and KS?
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